Trade with Labor Market Distortions and Heterogeneous Labor: Why Trade Can Hurt by Kala Krishna et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
TRADE WITH LABOR MARKET DISTORTIONS AND HETEROGENEOUS LABOR:










The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
© 2002 by Kala Krishna, Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay and Cemile Yavas.  All rights reserved.  Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.Trade with Labor Market Distortions and Heterogeneous Labor: Why Trade Can Hurt
Kala Krishna, Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay and Cemile Yavas
NBER Working Paper No. 9086
July 2002
JEL No. F16, O17, P23, P33
ABSTRACT
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The latter part of the 20th century saw a surge in trade volumes. Some develop-
ing countries liberalized trade hoping to emulate the success of the East Asian
miracle economies; others just out of the socialist bloc looked to the world for
consumer goods. Most did not perform very well. During the early stages of
liberalization, incomes even fell in many transition economies. It would seem
appropriate to ask what might lead to such diﬀerent experiences with trade
liberalization.
We argue that labor market distortions and their interactions with trade
liberalization might be important in answering this question. This paper is
related to the literature in trade on factor market distortions, work in Labor
Economics on heterogenous labor as well as to work in Development Economics
on organizational diﬀerences between developing and developed economies.
While factor market distortions and their eﬀect in open economies have
been a focus of much work in trade, attention has been targeted for the most
part on the eﬀects of minimum wages. See for example, the work of Brecher
(1974a,b) (which looks at the eﬀect of a minimum wage distortion on an open
economy) as well as the recent work of Davis (1998) (which looks at the eﬀects
of trade between an economy with a minimum wage distortion (Europe) and
one without it (the U.S.) and argues that trade may simultaneously prop up
U.S. wages and cause greater unemployment in Europe). The minimum wage
distortion in these studies is exogenously speciﬁed. Brecher (1992) develops an
eﬃciency wage model with an endogenous factor market distortion which results
in unemployment. The endogenous distortion in our model result in resource
misallocations, not in unemployment.1
1See Rodrik (1987) for some other examples of endogenous distortions and the importance
of modelling them in terms of structural parameters.
1If ﬁrms are unable to identify the ability of workers and workers are unable to
fully signal their ability then wages are positively related to the average ability
of the labor pool ﬁrms draw from. For example, Weiss (1980) develops such a
model in a partial equilibrium closed economy setting and argues that job queues
or unemployment could occur. Although our model has some common features
with these models, we have a general equilibrium model in an open-economy
setting.
There is also a large literature in Development Economics on the eﬀects
of family farms. However, most of this work deals with homogeneous labor
in a closed economy setting. Family farming results in workers earning the
average rather than the marginal product in agriculture. When workers are
identical in ability and marginal product is diminishing, as has been assumed
in this literature, average product exceeds marginal product so that too many
w o r k e r sr e m a i ni na g r i c u l t u r e .I nt h ed e v e lopment literature this distortion has
been linked with the concept of “Disguised Unemployment”, see Sen (1960).
However, when labor varies in ability, as in our model, only lower ability labor
remains in agriculture. The marginal worker obtains a wage below his marginal
value product. As a result too few workers remain in agriculture rather than
too many!
Diﬀerences in the way labor markets work crucially aﬀect how production is
organized in various economies. In market economies, workers are paid the value
of their marginal product so that labor allocation between sectors is eﬃcient.
Such economies can only gain from trade. On the other hand, institutional
constraints may prevent an eﬃcient allocation of labor. In this paper we look
at a particular kind of factor market distortion that can be interpreted in both
the context of an economy making the transition from a socialist to a market
economy, or in terms of institutions existing in parts of the developing world.
2In the former socialist economies (transition economies), the state owned
sectors (the distorted sector) usually pay a ﬂat wage per worker which is only
loosely related to ability. If other sectors are undistorted and pay a productiv-
ity based wage, the best workers are attracted to the undistorted sector while
the lower ability ones ﬂock to the distorted sector. In developing economies,
agriculture is run along family farm lines so that workers in agriculture (the
distorted sector) can be thought of as obtaining a ﬁxed wage rather than the
value of their marginal product. When workers diﬀer in their abilities, this leads
to higher ability workers leaving agriculture.
With either interpretation, the eﬀect of the distortion is the same. In au-
tarky, too little of the distorted good is made and its price is too high. As a
result, the distorted economy has a comparative disadvantage in the distorted
good which is imported when the economy is opened up. This reduces the out-
put of the distorted good and worsens the distortion. On the other hand, trade
results in the usual price eﬀects which raise welfare. Thus, welfare may rise or
fall as a result of trade liberalization. However, a large distorted economy always
loses from trade as it does not reap any beneﬁcial price eﬀe c t s .T h i si si nl i n e
w i t ht h el i t e r a t u r eo nt h et h e o r yo ft h es e c o n db e s t ,( s e eL i p s e ya n dL a n c a s t e r
(1956)) where a recurring theme is that in the presence of existing distortions,
reduction or removal of a distortion can lower welfare. See, for example (Ethier
1982).
In autarky, the eﬀect of the distortion on welfare depends on the extent
of substitutability in consumption. If the goods are perfect complements, in
autarky the consumption levels are the same as in an undistorted economy.
However if there is any substitutability, there is too little output in the distorted
sector. The more the substitutability, the greater the deleterious eﬀects of the
distortion; since the price of the distorted good is higher than in an undistorted
3economy, consumers substitute away from it a lot when substitutability is high,
causing far too little of the distorted good to be produced (as compared to the
eﬃcient level).
Trade involves importing the distorted good and with a Constant Elasticity
of Substitution formulation, greater substitutability results in gains from trade.
The more substitutable the goods are in consumption, the greater the price eﬀect
through trade. As the price eﬀect is beneﬁcial, trade tends to raise welfare.
This paper builds on Krishna and Yavas (2002), which uses a Ricardian
setup to show how such labor market distortions in transition and developing
countries aﬀect the level and distribution of income and hence the demand for
indivisible consumer goods. In their model, eﬀects in transition and developing
economies diﬀer, though the basic story is similar. They argue that in the
absence of trade, wages are high due to the distortion, and as a result demand
for indivisibles is high, which sustains these high wages. However, as the cost of
the distorted good is higher in the distorted economy, it tends to be imported,
with adverse consequences on the level and distribution of income.
Such factor market distortions have similar eﬀects even when goods are di-
visible. By modifying the standard trade models, namely the Ricardian, Speciﬁc
Factors, and Hecksher Ohlin models, we are able to look at a wider set of issues.
Section 2 develops the Ricardian model and shows how this distortion aﬀects
labor allocation and output and why trade always makes existing distortions
worse. We also look at the eﬀects of substitutability between goods on the
gains from trade for a distorted economy. Section 3 develops the SpeciﬁcF a c t o r s
model and argues that similar eﬀects obtain when the marginal productivity of
labor is diminishing. Section 4 deals with the Hecksher Ohlin model of trade
with an endogenous allocation of capital and shows that it does not alter the
ﬂavor of the results either. Section 5 contains some ﬁnal remarks.
42T h e R i c a r d i a n M o d e l
There are two economies, Home and Foreign, which have access to the same
technology, but diﬀer in their institutional arrangements2.T h e r ea r eac o n t i n -
uum of individuals, indexed by γ, who are uniformly distributed on the unit
interval with density related to the labor size. Type γ is endowed with γ units
of eﬀective labor. There are two goods, X and Y , and both goods are produced
under competitive conditions. It takes one unit of eﬀective labor, E,t om a k ea
unit of either good.
Let Y be the numeraire good with a price of unity. Let I be the total income
of the economy, and let P and P∗ denote the autarky price of X in Home and
Foreign. Let L and L∗ be the size of the labor force, i.e., the density of the
distribution of γ, in Home and Foreign, respectively. Labor in the Y sector is
paid the value of its marginal product in both economies. Labor in the X sector
is paid its marginal product in Foreign, but is paid a constant wage per worker,
independent of ability, in Home.
2.1 Autarky Equilibrium
In the undistorted economy, called Foreign, a worker with productivity γ earns
γ if he works in Y and γP∗ if he works in X. For both goods to be produced,
P∗ has to equal 1.3
Let ¯ w be the ﬁxed wage per worker in sector X in the distorted economy.
This ﬁxed wage has two interpretations. It can be interpreted as the wage
per worker paid by state owned manufacturing ﬁrms. Alternatively, it can be
interpreted as the income of a worker who works in the family farm and obtains
2S i n c ew ea r el o o k i n ga tt h ee ﬀects of diﬀerent labor market institutions we abstract from
diﬀerences in technology. These can be easily added to the model.
3For both goods to be produced, there must be some workers willing to work in each sector.
However at any P∗ 6= 1, all workers will prefer working in one or the other.

























the average product there.4 The allocation of labor is depicted in Figure 1. At
wage w, workers with γ>w ,that is workers in OA, choose to work in X.T h e
remaining workers choose to work in Y. An increase in the wage rate attracts
workers with higher ability into X and raises the average quality of labor there.
At wage ¯ w, and assuming γ is uniformly distributed, ¯ wL workers are em-
ployed in X, and total labor cost is ¯ w2L. On average, each worker has ¯ w
2 eﬀective






Hence, cost per unit of good X, and hence its price, P, is 2.
In Home, as a result of the ﬁxed wage per worker in sector X, workers (other
than the marginal one) earn more than they would in the undistorted sector.5
This raises the cost of producing good X, and hence its price. This, in turn,
reduces the demand and output of the distorted sector in autarky equilibrium.
4We asssume that all family farms have the same average ability.
5Note that in the market economy, the productivity of the workers in X is equal to the
value of marginal product in Y .





















Thus there are too few workers in the X s e c t o r .T h i si sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e2 .
The Production Possibility Frontier (PPF) of the distorted economy is the same
as that of the undistorted one and given the Ricardian setup, it is linear. The
undistorted economy produces at point A where the indiﬀerence curve is tangent
to the PPF. As there is no unemployment, the distorted economy remains on
the PPF. However, it produces at the wrong point, at B, making too little X.
At B t h ep r i c el i n ei sﬂatter than the PPF but is tangent to the indiﬀerence
curve since consumption decisions are not distorted.6
6In the extreme case where goods are perfect complements, the consumption and hence
output levels in a distorted economy under autarky are the same as in an undistorted economy.
However as long as there is any substitutability, there is too little output in the distorted sector.
72.2 Trade Equilibrium
Trade equilibrium is best understood using the standard relative demand (RD)
and relative supply (RS) framework. In Figure 3,R S W depicts the world rel-
ative supply. At P =1 , the undistorted economy becomes willing to produce
good X and it can produce up to L∗
2 units while the distorted economy produces
only good Y , L
2 units of it. Thus, the relative supply of good X at P =1i s ,
at most, L∗
L . For P ∈ (1,2) ,R S W = L∗
L . At P = 2, the distorted economy also
becomes willing to produce good X and RSW becomes horizontal. Thus, the
price under free trade, PF, d e p e n d so nt h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h et w oc o u n t r i e s ,L
and L∗.




depends on relative prices alone and is identical to that for
either country. If, in addition, X and Y enter preferences symmetrically, then
RDW =1a tP =1 . Since relative supply at P =1i sa tm o s t L∗
L , if L∗
L < 1,
then the intersection of RSW and RDW must occur at a point like b or c in
Figure 3. Hence PF must be greater than unity, and the undistorted economy
completely specializes in good X. If L
∗
L ≥ 1, then this intersection must occur
at a point like a in Figure 3. So PF = 1 and the distorted country completely
specializes in good Y.
This pattern makes sense since if L∗
L < 1, then Foreign is small relative
to Home, and it must specialize in the distorted good, X, in which it has a
comparative advantage. On the other hand, if L∗
L ≥ 1, then Foreign is large
relative to Home, it can produce enough to meet world demand of good X, and
therefore Home completely specializes in the undistorted good, Y, in which it
has a comparative advantage.











The undistorted economy never loses from trade. The eﬀects on the distorted
economy are varied. There are two eﬀects at play. Recall that the distorted
economy produces too little of the distorted good in autarky, and it has a
comparative disadvantage in its production. Trade makes this distortion worse
as the country produces even less of the distorted good after trade. There may
however be a welfare gain through lower prices of X.T h en e te ﬀect depends on
which one dominates. If substitutability between goods is parameterized using a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function, simulations show that
welfare rises due to trade for (σ, L∗
L ) that lie above a weakly downward sloping
curve denoted by σ(L∗
L ).
If L∗
L ≥ 1 then Home makes only Y. Hence, the output eﬀect is adverse.
However, as PF =1 , Home obtains the same welfare as that of an undistorted
9economy. Hence, trade must always raise welfare in Home.
If L∗
L < 1t h e nPF must exceed unity, occurring at a point like b or c in
Figure 3. For a given L∗
L , the lower the substitutability the higher the price in
free trade. This occurs because when goods enter preferences symmetrically, the
relative demand curve must always go through the point (1,1), i.e., the point a
in Figure 3. It is easy to see that when σ is high enough the free trade price is
close to unity, so Home welfare under trade approaches that of an undistorted
economy. As a result, Home gains from trade. As σ falls from this high value,
relative demand becomes steeper, rotating about the point (1,1). Since L
∗
L < 1,
the intersection with relative supply occurs at a higher price. At some level, say
ˆ σ, P r e a c h e s2 . A tt h i sl e v e lo fσ, welfare must fall due to trade since Home
makes only Y and prices are its autarky prices. By continuity, at some value of
σ in between Home neither gains nor loses from trade.
Once σ reaches ˆ σ, further decreases in σ do not aﬀect the price in free trade.
However, Home starts to produce both X and Y . In this region, Home must
lose from trade as there is no positive price eﬀect, and since Home imports X
its production of X must be lower than under autarky.7
3S p e c i ﬁcF a c t o r sM o d e l
Would the results derived above carry through if labor faced diminishing returns
as it would in the presence of other factors? In the next two sections we show
that their spirit does indeed carry through.
Consider the speciﬁc factors model. Each sector has a ﬁxed amount of a
speciﬁc factor which cannot move across sectors while labor is mobile. We
assume that Home and Foreign are identical in every respect except that Home
has a labor market distortion in X.L e tEi denote the eﬀective units of labor
7Suppose its output of X was the same as under autarky. Then as price is the same as
Home’s autarky price, it must neither import not export which is a contradiction.
10employed in sector i, and Ki denote the ﬁxed amount of speciﬁcf a c t o re m p l o y e d
in sector i, for i = X, Y .L e tX(EX,KX)a n dY (EY ,KY )d e n o t et h ec o n s t a n t
returns to scale production functions for the two sectors, and let the price of Y
be unity so that P denotes the relative price of X.
3.1 Autarky Equilibrium
As before, X pays a ﬁxed wage per worker regardless of workers’ ability while
workers earn the value of their marginal product in Y . As a result of this, lower
ability workers prefer to work for X while higher ability workers opt for Y. Let
˜ γ be the worker who is indiﬀerent between working for X and Y.
Let we = Y1(.) be the wage per eﬀective unit of labor in Y (where subscript
i denotes the derivative with respect to the ith argument). The earnings of a
worker with ability γ in Y are weγ while the earnings of a worker in X are ¯ w.
In equilibrium, the highest ability worker in X, or ˜ γ, is indiﬀerent between the
two sectors so that
we˜ γ =¯ w. (1)
Note that a worker’s decision whether to work for X or Y depends on ¯ w
we. As
this goes up, ˜ γ rises, and the number of workers as well as the eﬀective labor in
X rises while that in Y falls.
What determines the allocation of eﬀective labor in equilibrium? Note that
given our assumption that ability is distributed uniformly over the interval [0,1],
the average ability of workers employed in X is
˜ γ
2. We assume competition so
that ﬁrms in X take ¯ w and the average ability of the work force, (
˜ γ
2), as given,
and choose only how many such workers to hire.







j ) − ¯ wnj
11where nj is the proportion of labor force employed by ﬁrm j, and hence nj
˜ γ
2 is
the total units of eﬀective labor employed by ﬁrm j, denoted by Ej.K X
j is the


















Since all ﬁrms face the same prices and wages, their marginal products are equal-
ized. Given constant returns to scale production functions, marginal products





. Hence, it is equal for all




Using equation (3) and substituting for ¯ w using (1) into (2), and noting that





as the relation deﬁning the allocation of labor and relative supply in the distorted
economy.
Also note that when factors are paid in this manner, the value of output











=¯ wnj + rKX
j .
The ﬁrst equality follows from constant returns to scale. The second equality




j . The last follows from (2) and competitive capital markets.
As a result, whether one thinks of a ﬁx e dw a g ep e rp e r s o nb e i n gp a i di nX or
whether one thinks of workers in X being equal residual claimants to output in
X (once capital has been paid) gives the same result.
In an undistorted economy the marginal value products of the two sectors
are equalized so that
PX1(.)=Y1(.),





Figure 4 illustrates these relative supply curves. For any given allocation
of labor, and hence supplies, the price needed to elicit this relative supply in
the distorted economy is twice that needed to elicit the same relative supply in
the undistorted economy. Hence, at any given horizontal coordinate in Figure
4, the vertical coordinate of RS is twice that of RS∗. Given that preferences
are identical and homothetic, relative demand is the same in all economies, so
that diﬀerences in relative supplies translate to a higher autarky price of X in
the distorted economy. In Figure 4, point A depicts the autarky equilibrium in
Foreign, and point B depicts the autarky equilibrium in Home.
Given the higher autarky price, the distorted economy’s relative demand for,
and hence supply of, good X is lower than that in an undistorted economy, and
therefore sector X in a distorted economy employs too little eﬀective units of
labor relative to an undistorted one.
These results can be better understood using Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5
illustrates the allocation of eﬀective units of labor using the standard speciﬁc
factors diagram. The two ends of the box are the origins for the two sectors
and the downward sloping curves (with respect to their origins) depict the value
















VMPE X VMPE Y
A
B
14of marginal product of an eﬀective unit of labor in each sector. In the absence
of a factor market distortion, the marginal productivity of labor in each sector
is equalized. This is represented by point A. On the other hand, with labor
market distortions, from (4), it follows that
PX 1(.)=2 Y1(.)
and the marginal value product of an eﬀective unit of labor in X equals twice
that in Y. In other words, the equilibrium allocation of eﬀective units of labor is
such that the vertical length of the VMPE X, denoted by wX, is twice that of
the VMPE Y , denoted by wY , as illustrated by point B in Figure 5. Note that
at any price, less of X is made and more of Y is made as a result.8
Figure 6 depicts the production possibilities frontier for the distorted and
undistorted economies, as well as production (which equals consumption) in
autarky. Both economies have the same production possibility frontier (PPF) by
assumption, and they both produce on the frontier as there is no unemployment
in either. In the undistorted economy, the autarky relative price of good X (of
Y1(.)
X1(.)) is tangent to both the PPF and to the indiﬀerence curve of the economy
at point A. On the other hand, the distorted economy has a higher autarky
relative price of good X, (of
2Y1(.)
X1(.) ) and it consumes and produces less X as
depicted by point B. Moreover, the slope of the PPF at B is steeper than the
price ratio which equals the slope of the indiﬀerence curve through B. Note that
as a result its welfare is below that of the undistorted economy.
3.2 Free Trade Equilibrium
What will be the eﬀect of trade in this environment? Does the distortion always
get worse as in the Ricardian model, or can it get better? The answer follows
8With many sectors the same arguments work. As in Figure 5, draw the horizontal sum
of VMPE in each distorted sector using OX as the origin and the the horizontal sum of
VMPE in each undistorted sector using OY as the origin. In equilibrium, the VMPE in
each distorted sector equals the twice that in each undistorted sector.


















quite simply. Given the relative supplies of the two economies as depicted in
Figure 4, the world relative supply is given by RSW which must lie in between
RS and RS∗. As relative demand for the world equals the common relative
demand of the two countries, the free trade price must lie in between two autarky
prices, as depicted by point C in Figure 4. Therefore, after opening up, Home
observes a decline in the relative price of good X and hence its relative supply
falls short of its relative demand and it imports good X and exports good Y.
Note that a reduction in relative supply of X moves Home along its PPF
to point C in Figure 6, thereby worsening the distortion in output. At given
prices, this reduces welfare. However, the price of X also falls through trade. As
Home is an importer of X, this raises welfare. The net eﬀect of trade depends
on which of these two eﬀects, the output eﬀect or the price eﬀect, dominates.
Under free trade, Home consumption lies along the line through C with slope
16PF. It lies to the left of C as X is imported. Similarly, Foreign consumption in
Free trade lies along the line through D with slope PF. It lies to the right of D
as X is exported.
As an economy gets larger, the relative price in the free trade equilibrium
approaches its autarky price, and therefore the extent of the beneﬁcial price
eﬀect falls. If Home country is very large, then the free trade price will be very
close to its autarky price, and the price eﬀect will be negligible. On the other
hand, since the other country will export good X and import good Y at, the
output eﬀect will remain. Therefore, it follows that a large economy must lose
from trade.9
It is worth noting that trade between two distorted economies, one with a
distortion in X and the other with a distortion in Y, causes the distortion in
both countries to get worse as each country has a comparative disadvantage in
the production of the good in which it has a distortion, and it will import this
good in trade equilibrium producing even less of it.
4 Heckscher-Ohlin Model
What makes the Heckscher-Ohlin model diﬀerent from the speciﬁcf a c t o r sm o d e l
is the assumption that K as well as E is mobile across sectors. This allows us to
ask how the allocation of capital is aﬀected by the distortion in the labor market,
the eﬀects of trade on this allocation decision, as well as the consequences of
endogenous capital allocation for trade.
Assume, as usual, that there are no factor intensity reversals. Let cX(w,r)
and cY (w,r) denote the unit cost functions in the two sectors in the absence
of any distortions where w is the wage per eﬀective unit of labor and r is the
9Diﬀerent groups are aﬀected by trade as in the standard speciﬁc factors setup. The real
return to the speciﬁc factor whose relative price goes up rises, while that of the other speciﬁc
factor falls. The eﬀect on the real return of labor depends on their preferences.
17rental rate. In equilibrium, cX(w,r)=P and cY (w,r)=1 . These conditions
a r ed e p i c t e di nF i g u r e7b yt h ec u r v e sX and Y respectively. For both goods to
be produced, factor prices must lie at their intersection, namely A.10 As in the
standard model, price cannot exceed cost as proﬁts are zero, and if cost exceeds
price, output is zero.
In the presence of the distortion, the wage per eﬃciency unit of labor will
diﬀer between sectors. If the wage per eﬃciency unit of labor in Y is wY , then
workers choose between earning wY γ in X and ¯ w in Y. The marginal worker,
type ˜ γ, gets the same in both sectors so that
wY ˜ γ =¯ w. (5)
Note that each worker in X has an average eﬃciency of
˜ γ
2. Let wX denote the










cY (wY ,r)=1 ( 7 )
give the analogous equilibrium conditions in the distorted economy. The curve
X0 which lies halfway between the curve X and the horizontal axis depicts (6)
in Figure 7. In the absence of specialization, factor prices are given by the point
B for the Y sector and the point C for the X sector. It is worth noting that
the factor market distortion can easily lead to specialization in Y at a given
price as X0 and Y may not intersect though X and Y do. The specialization
10See Mussa (1979) for the classical exposition of the Hecksher Ohlin model in terms of its
dual.























19in Y can be analyzed along standard lines. Here we focus on the case where
both countries produce both goods. We look at how the distortion aﬀects factor
prices, capital labor ratios, factor allocations and output in a distorted economy
relative to an undistorted one and whether it depends on whether X is capital
intensive relative to Y or not.
If X is capital intensive, as depicted in Figure 7(a), then the wage-rental
ratio, and hence capital-eﬀective labor ratio, rises in both sectors relative to
that in the undistorted economy. Since C is vertically above B, the wage-rental
ratio rises by more in X than in Y, and X remains relatively capital intensive.
Since total capital and labor is given, the only way for capital intensity to rise
in both sectors is for the output of the labor intensive good, Y, along with the
allocation of both factors to Y, to rise.
This is easy to verify using the standard Rybczynski box with dimensions K
and E, the availability of capital and eﬀective labor in the economy, as depicted
in Figure 8. Factor market clearing can be depicted by adding the vector of
factor use in X to that in Y (or Y to X) and having this sum reach the other
end of the box, i.e., factor markets clear. If X is capital intensive, then the ray
denoting the vector of factor use in X is steeper than that in Y ,a sd e p i c t e di n
Figure 8(a). For given wage-rental ratios, the output levels and factor usages in
the two sectors are implicitly given by the intersection of the two rays, at point
A. The coordinates of point A give the capital and eﬀective labor usage in X
while the remaining factors are used in Y. An increase in the wage rental ratio
raises the capital-eﬀective labor ratio in both sectors, making both rays steeper.
At the new intersection, at point B, X must use less capital and less eﬀective
labor, so that at a given price, relative supply of X is lower in the distorted
economy.
What if X is labor intensive, as depicted in Figure 7(b)? At a given price,













































































(b) X is Labor Intensive
A
B
21if both goods are made, the distorted economy has a lower wage-rental ratio,
and hence capital-eﬀective labor ratio, relative to the undistorted economy in
both X and Y s i n c et h es l o p eo ft h el i n ef r o mt h eo r i g i nt h r o u g hA exceeds that
through B or C. The only way for capital intensity to fall in both sectors is for
the output of the capital intensive good, Y, along with the allocation of both
factors to Y, to rise. Again, this is easy to verify using the Rybczynski box. If
X is the labor-intensive sector, then the ray denoting the vector of factor usage
in X is ﬂatter than that in Y as illustrated in Figure 8(b). A decrease in the
wage-rental ratio will reduce the capital-eﬀective labor ratio in both sectors. In
the Rybczynski box, this corresponds to both rays getting ﬂatter. At the new
equilibrium, at point B, sector X uses less capital and less eﬀective labor, and
hence relative supply of X is lower in the distorted economy, as earlier.
One might ask at this stage why X must be labor intensive relative to Y in
the distorted economy. Since the wage-rental ratio, and hence, one might argue,
the capital-eﬀective labor ratio, could rise by more in X than in Y, it seems that
X might become the capital intensive sector in the distorted economy, despite
the absence of factor intensity reversals. That is, what prevents the slope of
X at C from exceeding that of Y at B? We argue that this cannot happen
in the absence of factor intensity reversals. The reasoning is simple. Fix a
price. Assuming that both goods are made in the undistorted economy, the
capital-eﬀective labor ratio in the two sectors in the undistorted economy must
bracket the economy’s capital-eﬀective labor ratio. As X is labor intensive, its
capital-eﬀective labor ratio must lie below k,t h ec a p i t a l - e ﬀective labor ratio of
the economy as a whole, while that of Y must lie above k. Since the wage rental
ratio falls in both X and Y, so do capital labor ratios. If the capital-eﬀective
labor ratio in Y falls so much that it lies below that in X, both sectors’ capital
labor ratios must lie below k. However, this is inconsistent with factor markets
22clearing in the distorted economy.
Thus, whether X is capital or labor intensive, the distortion in the labor
market in X results not only in a decrease in the allocation of labor to X but
also a decline in capital allocated to X at given prices. In other words, the
eﬀects of distortion on the relative supply of X is more pronounced than in the
speciﬁc factors model where capital could not move across sectors. The relative
supply for the distorted and undistorted economies (RS and RS∗)a r ea si n
Figure 4. As relative demand is the same for both, the points E and F depict
their autarky equilibria. Since RS lies to the left of RS∗, the autarky price
in the distorted economy must exceed that in the undistorted one and the free
trade price lies in between them. As a result, the price of X in the distorted
economy falls due to trade, and it imports X which further reduces its output
of it. Once again, while the price eﬀect of trade raises welfare in the distorted
economy, the output eﬀect reduces it. The net eﬀect will depend on which of
these dominates as earlier.
Our main results are thus independent of which model we choose to use. The
factor market distortion creates a comparative disadvantage in X. The price of
X falls through trade for the distorted economy but as X is imported so does
its output. The fall in the price of X raises welfare while the fall in output of
X makes existing distortion worse.
5 Conclusion
The last decade has seen a large number of countries embracing trade reforms.
However, many of them have not been able to emulate the success of the fast
growing East Asian countries. Our analysis suggests that labor market distor-
tion prevalent in developing countries might lead to a fall in welfare, especially
for a large country, when such economies open up to trade. While the East
23Asian economies were small, economies that have not done as well tend to be
larger.
Our results are consistent with the experiences of some transition economies.
Most sectors in the erstwhile socialist economies were state owned in the old
regime. This corresponds to all sectors having the labor market distortion. It is
easy to verify that in our model if all sectors are distorted, production decisions
remain eﬃcient. Reform consisting of privatizing some sectors would however
result in ineﬃciencies in production decisions, which would be worsened through
trade. This is yet another example of the Theorem of the Second Best and the
dangers of partial reform. Our analysis suggests that a dip in national income
occurring in the initial stages of privatization is likely. This is consistent with the
initial post reform experience of almost all transition economies, see Figure 1.2
in a recent monograph, World Bank (2002). Boeri and Terrell (2002) argue that
part of the reason for the diﬀering experiences in transition of the countries of
the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and those of the Central and Eastern European
(CEE) can be explained in part by the diﬀerent labor market policies they
adopted.11
While our work here focuses on the implications of a labor market distortion,
there are, of course, many other aspects of the experience of both developing and
transition economies which are not addressed here. Many reasons have been put
forward to explain the diﬀerential performance of developing economies. See,
for example, Krueger (1984) and Ray (1998) for an overview of some of this
literature. Similarly, there have been a number of interesting hypotheses put
forward to explain the sharp decline in industrial output and GDP in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union countries. These include slow adjustment
11The CEE countries propped up wages at the bottom of the distribution while the FSU
countries allowed greater wage ﬂexibility. As a result, unproductive sectors collapsed more in
the former than in the latter.
24resulting in unemployment, see Gomulka (1992), investment delays caused by
the unwillingness to invest till a good match is found since investment is rela-
tion speciﬁc, see Roland and Verdier (1999), and the disorganization hypothesis
of Blanchard and Kremer (1997), where strong complementarities between in-
puts allows suppliers to exercise their bargaining power and disrupt production
chains.
Our work has some natural extensions. In this paper, we assume that when
there are other scarce factors of production, labor in the distorted sector shares
t h er e s i d u a lo u t p u ta f t e rt h e s ef a c t o r sa r ep a i dt h ev a l u eo ft h e i rm a r g i n a lp r o d -
uct. This corresponds to the existence of a perfect market in land and capital.
All those who own land or capital earn the return from it and this is separate
from who works it. However, in many developing countries, leaving the family
farm means giving up your rights on the land, and workers who remain in the
family farm share the entire output of the farm. The implications of such a
labor market distortion are diﬀerent than the one analyzed here. For one, the
factor market distortion could result in too little or too much being produced.
Another natural extension concerns capital ﬂows. There have been large cap-
ital ﬂows between market economies and transition and developing economies
(see Lucas (1990)). Here we do not allow capital to move between countries.
Augmented versions of this model can also help explain the simultaneous occur-
rence of factor movements and goods trade without resorting to explanations
relying on trade barriers (as does the work on Multinationals) or adjustment
costs (which results in capital ﬂows being spread out over time). Extending the
model in these directions is part of an on-going research agenda.
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